阴谋论多个变体的联系与区分

The "conspiracy theories" that have appeared or been measured in previous psychological studies are not uniform. Goertzel (1994) conducted the frst quantitative study of belief in conspiracy theories from a psychological perspective. Since then, conspiracy theories have often been interpreted as a homogeneous phenomenon, and are often conceptualized as a "mentality" or a stable personal tendency to "believe that conspiracies will happen". In recent years, more and more researchers have shifted their focus from a "stable" conspiracy mentality to beliefs in specifc conspiracy theories. They have often investigated specifc conspiracy beliefs regarding the content of events in society in the context of real events that have occurred. However, general conspiracy mentality and specifc conspiracy beliefs are often confated as the two most central variants of conspiracy theory in empirical research in psychology. Therefore, this paper frst makes a detailed theoretical analysis of these two variants of conspiracy theories. General conspiracy mentality refers to a psychological tendency that individuals prefer to attribute signifcant events to conspiracy theories, rather than to specifc events. Specifc conspiracy beliefs (or beliefs in conspiracy theories) refer to the belief that a specifc signifcant (particularly negative) social event is the result of the covert actions of some powerful secret groups. In our current work, we summarize four similarities and fve major differences between the two. In particular, we tease apart different previous measures of general conspiracy mentality and specifc conspiracy beliefs. Most importantly, we believe that belief in specifc conspiracy theories may depend on both the general conspiracy mentality and the context of the event. It is inappropriate to homogenize various specifc conspiracy beliefs into a unidimensional mentality. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between general conspiracy mentality and specifc conspiracy beliefs. It has become an important trend in current conspiracy psychology research to distinguish general conspiracy mentality from specific conspiracy belief, and to investigate the latter or both in empirical research. In recent years, researchers have categorized specifc conspiracy beliefs differently when examining their antecedents and aftereffects. Following the existential threat model of conspiracy theories, social identity theory, and evolutionary function theory of conspiracy theories, we propose that specifc conspiracy beliefs can be divided into two new variants of conspiracy theories: beliefs in ingroup conspiracy theories and beliefs in outgroup conspiracy theories. Examples of beliefs in ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories can be the struggle of different political parties in elections or a struggle for political and economic interests between different countries. It can also be consistent animosity between different nationalities. Previous research has found that ingroup and outgroup conspiracy beliefs may arise from different motivational processes, and that believing in ingroup and outgroup conspiracy theories may have different social consequences. These two fndings highlight the need to distinguish between these two variants. From the theoretical point of view, the existential threat model of conspiracy theory emphasizes the important role of an "antagonistic outgroup" when sense-making process leads individuals to believe in conspiracy theory. According to evolutionary psychology, conspiracy theories are associated with "hostile coalitions". According to social identity theory, positive social identity is enhanced when people are aware of the superiority of their group over the outgroup, whereas they may take steps to regain ingroup status when their group is in a position of relative weakness, such as believing in conspiracy theories of their opposing outgroup or other powerful outgroups. All of these theories suggest that we need to categorize groups when examining specifc conspiracy beliefs. Moreover, an increasing number of empirical studies have explored the relationships between ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy beliefs and different variables by distinguishing between them. Some researchers have also examined the possible different consequences of ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories. Thus, this paper explains the necessity, rationality and demand for re-categorizing specifc conspiracy beliefs from an intergroup perspective from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. In conclusion, by continuously conceptualizing and refning different variants of conspiracy theories, we can avoid disagreements in future conspiracy-related research, clarify and refne our understanding of conspiracy theories, and prevent future research from overgeneralizing this central conceptualization of conspiracy theories. We also admit that there are many doubts and challenges in our current work. However, the relationship and distinction between the different variants of conspiracy theory is a fundamental question that frames the overall research of conspiracy psychology, so this still needs to be explored in greater depth by researchers.