As Mudde (2012) posits, Euroscepticism has become something of a ‘cottage industry’ that has subsequently expanded significantly. However, in spite of a voluminous body of work outlining different approaches as to how we define a Eurosceptic, a singular idea of what Euroscepticism actually represents is yet to be widely agreed. The complexity of disaggregating criticism of a specific European Union (EU) policy from sustained contestation of the European project has led to the resilience of the basic Taggart-Szczerbiak model of hard/soft Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002). More recently this complexity has been accentuated by the increase in velocity of the presence of Euroscepticism in European party systems and civil society. As a result it has become something of an impossible task to adequately develop a taxonomy for understanding opposition to European integration, as it evolves at such a pace.
|Title of host publication||Euroscepticism as a Transnational and Pan-European Phenomenon|
|Subtitle of host publication||The Emergence of a New Sphere of Opposition|
|Editors||John FitzGibbon, Benjamin Leruth, Nick Startin|
|Place of Publication||London|
|Number of pages||9|
|Publication status||Published - 19 Aug 2016|
FitzGibbon, J., & Leruth, B. (2016). Conclusion and Epilogue: Transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism after Brexit. In J. FitzGibbon, B. Leruth, & N. Startin (Eds.), Euroscepticism as a Transnational and Pan-European Phenomenon: The Emergence of a New Sphere of Opposition (1 ed., pp. 163-176). London: Routledge.