Dismissal Disputes and the Incentives to Bargain: Estimates of the Contract Zone

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    Abstract

    In many countries the arbitration of dismissal disputes by public tribunals and state agencies is regarded as slow and expensive. Some common law countries, including the United States and Australia, are privatizing dispute resolution on the premise that this is more efficient than using statutory channels, and it is thus perceived as a better method of settling disputes. Previous advances in statutory law regarding the arbitration of dismissal disputes have been either rescinded or circumvented, sometimes with dramatic political consequences. Little is known, however, about the extent to which statutory law induces inefficiency and redistribution. The author uses settlement and arbitration cost information derived from both Australian courts and survey research for the period 2001–2008 to estimate the contract zone of average settlements, that is, the legal, stigmatic and uncertainty costs saved by averting arbitration. He finds that dispute resolution under statutory law is not as wasteful as it initially seems, nor are substantial resources redistributed from business owners to labor suppliers.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)576-598
    Number of pages23
    JournalIndustrial and Labor Relations Review
    Volume64
    Issue number3
    Publication statusPublished - 2011

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    Costs
    Personnel
    Industry
    Incentives
    Arbitration
    Dispute
    Uncertainty
    Dispute resolution
    Inefficiency
    Cost uncertainty
    Redistribution
    Suppliers
    Resources
    Common law
    Survey research
    Information costs
    Labor
    Owners

    Cite this

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    abstract = "In many countries the arbitration of dismissal disputes by public tribunals and state agencies is regarded as slow and expensive. Some common law countries, including the United States and Australia, are privatizing dispute resolution on the premise that this is more efficient than using statutory channels, and it is thus perceived as a better method of settling disputes. Previous advances in statutory law regarding the arbitration of dismissal disputes have been either rescinded or circumvented, sometimes with dramatic political consequences. Little is known, however, about the extent to which statutory law induces inefficiency and redistribution. The author uses settlement and arbitration cost information derived from both Australian courts and survey research for the period 2001–2008 to estimate the contract zone of average settlements, that is, the legal, stigmatic and uncertainty costs saved by averting arbitration. He finds that dispute resolution under statutory law is not as wasteful as it initially seems, nor are substantial resources redistributed from business owners to labor suppliers.",
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    Dismissal Disputes and the Incentives to Bargain: Estimates of the Contract Zone. / Freyens, Benoit.

    In: Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 64, No. 3, 2011, p. 576-598.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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