TY - GEN
T1 - Finite population trust game replicators
AU - Greenwood, Garrison
AU - Abbass, Hussein
AU - Petraki, Eleni
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - Our previous work introduced the N player trust game and examined the dynamics of this game using replicator dynamics for an infinite population. In finite populations, quantization becomes a necessity that introduces discontinuity in the trajectory space, which can impact the dynamics of the game differently. In this paper, we present an analysis of replicator dynamics of the N player trust game in finite populations. The analysis reveals that, quantization indeed introduces fixed points in the interior of the 2-simplex that were not present in the infinite population analysis. However, there is no guarantee that these fixed points will continue to exist for any arbitrary population size; thus, they are clearly an artifact of quantization. In general, the evolutionary dynamics of the finite population are qualitatively similar to the infinite population. This suggests that for the proposed trust game, trusters will be extinct if the population contains an untrustworthy player. Therefore, trusting is an evolutionary unstable strategy.
AB - Our previous work introduced the N player trust game and examined the dynamics of this game using replicator dynamics for an infinite population. In finite populations, quantization becomes a necessity that introduces discontinuity in the trajectory space, which can impact the dynamics of the game differently. In this paper, we present an analysis of replicator dynamics of the N player trust game in finite populations. The analysis reveals that, quantization indeed introduces fixed points in the interior of the 2-simplex that were not present in the infinite population analysis. However, there is no guarantee that these fixed points will continue to exist for any arbitrary population size; thus, they are clearly an artifact of quantization. In general, the evolutionary dynamics of the finite population are qualitatively similar to the infinite population. This suggests that for the proposed trust game, trusters will be extinct if the population contains an untrustworthy player. Therefore, trusting is an evolutionary unstable strategy.
KW - Evolutionary game theory
KW - N-person trust game
KW - Trust
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84958582250&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.mendeley.com/research/finite-population-trust-game-replicators
UR - http://www.acalci.net/2016/index.html
UR - http://www.acalci.net/2016/cfp.html
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-28270-1_27
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-28270-1_27
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84958582250
SN - 9783319282695
VL - 9592
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 324
EP - 335
BT - Artificial Life and Computational Intelligence
A2 - Ray, Tapabrata
A2 - Sarker, Ruhul
A2 - Li, Xiaodong
PB - Springer
CY - Cham, Switzerland
T2 - 2nd Australasian Conference on Artificial Life and Computational Intelligence
Y2 - 2 February 2016 through 5 February 2016
ER -