Finite population trust game replicators

Garrison Greenwood, Hussein Abbass, Eleni Petraki

Research output: A Conference proceeding or a Chapter in BookConference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Our previous work introduced the N player trust game and examined the dynamics of this game using replicator dynamics for an infinite population. In finite populations, quantization becomes a necessity that introduces discontinuity in the trajectory space, which can impact the dynamics of the game differently. In this paper, we present an analysis of replicator dynamics of the N player trust game in finite populations. The analysis reveals that, quantization indeed introduces fixed points in the interior of the 2-simplex that were not present in the infinite population analysis. However, there is no guarantee that these fixed points will continue to exist for any arbitrary population size; thus, they are clearly an artifact of quantization. In general, the evolutionary dynamics of the finite population are qualitatively similar to the infinite population. This suggests that for the proposed trust game, trusters will be extinct if the population contains an untrustworthy player. Therefore, trusting is an evolutionary unstable strategy.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationArtificial Life and Computational Intelligence
Subtitle of host publicationSecond Australasian Conference, ACALCI 2016 Canberra, ACT, Australia, February 2–5, 2016 Proceedings
EditorsTapabrata Ray, Ruhul Sarker, Xiaodong Li
Place of PublicationCham, Switzerland
PublisherSpringer
Pages324-335
Number of pages12
Volume9592
ISBN (Electronic)9783319282701
ISBN (Print)9783319282695
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016
Event2nd Australasian Conference on Artificial Life and Computational Intelligence, ACALCI 2016 - Canberra, Australia
Duration: 2 Feb 20165 Feb 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume9592
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference2nd Australasian Conference on Artificial Life and Computational Intelligence, ACALCI 2016
CountryAustralia
CityCanberra
Period2/02/165/02/16

Fingerprint

Finite Population
Game
Replicator Dynamics
Quantization
Fixed point
Evolutionary Dynamics
Population Size
Discontinuity
Interior
Continue
Unstable
Trajectories
Trajectory
Arbitrary

Cite this

Greenwood, G., Abbass, H., & Petraki, E. (2016). Finite population trust game replicators. In T. Ray, R. Sarker, & X. Li (Eds.), Artificial Life and Computational Intelligence: Second Australasian Conference, ACALCI 2016 Canberra, ACT, Australia, February 2–5, 2016 Proceedings (Vol. 9592, pp. 324-335). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9592). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28270-1_27
Greenwood, Garrison ; Abbass, Hussein ; Petraki, Eleni. / Finite population trust game replicators. Artificial Life and Computational Intelligence: Second Australasian Conference, ACALCI 2016 Canberra, ACT, Australia, February 2–5, 2016 Proceedings. editor / Tapabrata Ray ; Ruhul Sarker ; Xiaodong Li. Vol. 9592 Cham, Switzerland : Springer, 2016. pp. 324-335 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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Greenwood, G, Abbass, H & Petraki, E 2016, Finite population trust game replicators. in T Ray, R Sarker & X Li (eds), Artificial Life and Computational Intelligence: Second Australasian Conference, ACALCI 2016 Canberra, ACT, Australia, February 2–5, 2016 Proceedings. vol. 9592, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 9592, Springer, Cham, Switzerland, pp. 324-335, 2nd Australasian Conference on Artificial Life and Computational Intelligence, ACALCI 2016, Canberra, Australia, 2/02/16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28270-1_27

Finite population trust game replicators. / Greenwood, Garrison; Abbass, Hussein; Petraki, Eleni.

Artificial Life and Computational Intelligence: Second Australasian Conference, ACALCI 2016 Canberra, ACT, Australia, February 2–5, 2016 Proceedings. ed. / Tapabrata Ray; Ruhul Sarker; Xiaodong Li. Vol. 9592 Cham, Switzerland : Springer, 2016. p. 324-335 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9592).

Research output: A Conference proceeding or a Chapter in BookConference contribution

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Greenwood G, Abbass H, Petraki E. Finite population trust game replicators. In Ray T, Sarker R, Li X, editors, Artificial Life and Computational Intelligence: Second Australasian Conference, ACALCI 2016 Canberra, ACT, Australia, February 2–5, 2016 Proceedings. Vol. 9592. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. 2016. p. 324-335. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28270-1_27