Government Popularity and the Falklands War: A Reassessment

David Sanders, Hugh Ward, David Marsh, Tony Fletcher

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

106 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Mrs Thatcher's decisive and determined stand during the Falklands crisis in 1982 has been widely credited with restoring the electoral fortunes of the Conservative party in the run-up to the 1983 general election. This article argues that the Falklands war produced a boost to Conservative popularity of at most three percentage points for a period of only three months. Government popularity was already accelerating as a result of macroeconomic factors before the outbreak of the Falklands crisis, in particular ‘personal economic expectations’ proved to be of critical theoretical and empirical significance, and can be modelled satisfactorily on the basis purely of objective macroeconomic indices. Thus macroeconomic factors were at the root of the revival of Mrs Thatcher's political fortunes, and most of the boost to government popularity which occurred in the spring of 1982 derived from intelligent (or cynical) macroeconomic management. The Falklands crisis merely coincided with a jump in government popularity which would have occurred anyway in the wake of Geoffrey Howe's 1982 Budget.

LanguageEnglish
Pages281-313
Number of pages33
JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
Volume17
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 1987
Externally publishedYes

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popularity
economic factors
macroeconomics
conservative party
budget
election
management
economics

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Sanders, David ; Ward, Hugh ; Marsh, David ; Fletcher, Tony. / Government Popularity and the Falklands War : A Reassessment. In: British Journal of Political Science. 1987 ; Vol. 17, No. 3. pp. 281-313.
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Government Popularity and the Falklands War : A Reassessment. / Sanders, David; Ward, Hugh; Marsh, David; Fletcher, Tony.

In: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 17, No. 3, 01.01.1987, p. 281-313.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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