Re-Thinking Executive Control of And Accountability for the Agency

Benedict SHEEHY, Don Feaver

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

47 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

The organization of many Western governments has undergone dramatic structural and procedural changes over the past century. A large portion of public administration previously done by departments within a more centralized structure of government has been shifted to administrative units, often referred to as “agencies” that fall outside the constitutional core—an “agencified” model. This article investigates the historical contexts and legal developments associated with these changes and illuminates how “agencification” has altered the balance between executive control powers and executive accountability obligations. It examines how the organizational changes have been addressed in both the responsible government models of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and the republican presidential model of the United States. The article identifies a separation of accountability and control by the executive through its use of the agency and draws conclusions with implications for constitutional law, political theory, and practice.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)175-224
Number of pages50
JournalOsgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume54
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2016

Fingerprint

responsibility
constitutional law
political theory
organizational change
public administration
obligation
Canada
organization

Cite this

@article{c318de80971343bab8e0a3708ea94517,
title = "Re-Thinking Executive Control of And Accountability for the Agency",
abstract = "The organization of many Western governments has undergone dramatic structural and procedural changes over the past century. A large portion of public administration previously done by departments within a more centralized structure of government has been shifted to administrative units, often referred to as “agencies” that fall outside the constitutional core—an “agencified” model. This article investigates the historical contexts and legal developments associated with these changes and illuminates how “agencification” has altered the balance between executive control powers and executive accountability obligations. It examines how the organizational changes have been addressed in both the responsible government models of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and the republican presidential model of the United States. The article identifies a separation of accountability and control by the executive through its use of the agency and draws conclusions with implications for constitutional law, political theory, and practice.",
keywords = "Administrative agencies, Separation of powers, Government accountability",
author = "Benedict SHEEHY and Don Feaver",
year = "2016",
month = "1",
language = "English",
volume = "54",
pages = "175--224",
journal = "Osgoode Hall Law Journal",
issn = "0030-6185",
number = "1",

}

Re-Thinking Executive Control of And Accountability for the Agency. / SHEEHY, Benedict; Feaver, Don.

In: Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 54, No. 1, 01.2016, p. 175-224.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Re-Thinking Executive Control of And Accountability for the Agency

AU - SHEEHY, Benedict

AU - Feaver, Don

PY - 2016/1

Y1 - 2016/1

N2 - The organization of many Western governments has undergone dramatic structural and procedural changes over the past century. A large portion of public administration previously done by departments within a more centralized structure of government has been shifted to administrative units, often referred to as “agencies” that fall outside the constitutional core—an “agencified” model. This article investigates the historical contexts and legal developments associated with these changes and illuminates how “agencification” has altered the balance between executive control powers and executive accountability obligations. It examines how the organizational changes have been addressed in both the responsible government models of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and the republican presidential model of the United States. The article identifies a separation of accountability and control by the executive through its use of the agency and draws conclusions with implications for constitutional law, political theory, and practice.

AB - The organization of many Western governments has undergone dramatic structural and procedural changes over the past century. A large portion of public administration previously done by departments within a more centralized structure of government has been shifted to administrative units, often referred to as “agencies” that fall outside the constitutional core—an “agencified” model. This article investigates the historical contexts and legal developments associated with these changes and illuminates how “agencification” has altered the balance between executive control powers and executive accountability obligations. It examines how the organizational changes have been addressed in both the responsible government models of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and the republican presidential model of the United States. The article identifies a separation of accountability and control by the executive through its use of the agency and draws conclusions with implications for constitutional law, political theory, and practice.

KW - Administrative agencies

KW - Separation of powers

KW - Government accountability

M3 - Article

VL - 54

SP - 175

EP - 224

JO - Osgoode Hall Law Journal

JF - Osgoode Hall Law Journal

SN - 0030-6185

IS - 1

ER -