Abstract
Starting a firm with expansive potential is an option for educated and high-skilled workers. If there are labor market frictions, this additional option can be seen as reducing the chances of ending up in a low-wage job and hence as increasing the incentives for education. In a matching model, we show that reducing the start-up costs for new firms results in higher take-up rates of education. It also gives rise - through a thick-market externality - to higher rates of job creation for high-skilled labor as well as average match productivity. We provide empirical evidence to support our argument.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 317-337 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Scandinavian Journal of Economics |
| Volume | 108 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jul 2006 |
| Externally published | Yes |