“The Bureaucracy” as an Interest Group

Research output: A Conference proceeding or a Chapter in BookChapter

Abstract

Rational choice theories of bureaucratic interests started simple and have become somewhat more sophisticated over time. Early, “classical” models stressed either budget maximization or rent seeking as dominant motivations and predicted chronically unbalanced or dysfunctional outcomes—respectively, bureaucratic oversupply or radical undersupply (to create artificial scarcity rents). They also assumed a woefully uninformed legislature or ministers. Revisionist models stress more complex pictures. Bureau-shaping theory argues that the diversity of agency structures creates differing motivations—so that some top officials may oversupply (e.g. in defense), while others create queues or overcut budgets (e.g. in welfare areas). Some agencies or nongovernmental organizations achieve particular “market” constructs, where a pooling equilibrium is successfully created, attracting only intrinsically motivated staff to work in a mission-specific organization. Bureaucracies’ use of hierarchy has also been defended in economic terms—for reasons analogous to those maintaining large firms, or as a rational response to delegation issues in “normal” democracies, where delegation is straightforward. In the United States, delegation to bureaucracies is more complex and directly contingent on political factors, in Congress especially.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Public Choice
EditorsRoger D. Congleton, Stefan Voigt
Place of PublicationNew York, USA
PublisherOxford University Press
Chapter29
Pages567-584
Number of pages19
Volume1
ISBN (Electronic)9780190469740
ISBN (Print)9780190469733
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2019
Externally publishedYes

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bureaucracy
interest group
rent
budget
rational choice theory
political factors
minister
non-governmental organization
welfare
democracy
staff
firm
organization
market
economics
time

Cite this

DUNLEAVY, P. (2019). “The Bureaucracy” as an Interest Group. In R. D. Congleton, & S. Voigt (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice (Vol. 1, pp. 567-584). New York, USA: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.28
DUNLEAVY, Patrick. / “The Bureaucracy” as an Interest Group. The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice. editor / Roger D. Congleton ; Stefan Voigt. Vol. 1 New York, USA : Oxford University Press, 2019. pp. 567-584
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DUNLEAVY, P 2019, “The Bureaucracy” as an Interest Group. in RD Congleton & S Voigt (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice. vol. 1, Oxford University Press, New York, USA, pp. 567-584. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.28

“The Bureaucracy” as an Interest Group. / DUNLEAVY, Patrick.

The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice. ed. / Roger D. Congleton; Stefan Voigt. Vol. 1 New York, USA : Oxford University Press, 2019. p. 567-584.

Research output: A Conference proceeding or a Chapter in BookChapter

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DUNLEAVY P. “The Bureaucracy” as an Interest Group. In Congleton RD, Voigt S, editors, The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice. Vol. 1. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. 2019. p. 567-584 https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.28