The E-mail game revisited - Modeling rough inductive reasoning

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2 Citations (Scopus)


I study the robustness of Rubinstein's (1989) E-Mail Game results by varying the information that players can utilize. The article follows one of Morris' (2002) reactions to the E-Mail game "that one should try to come up with a model of boundedly rational behavior that delivers predictions that are insensitive to whether there is common knowledge or a large number of levels of knowledge". Players in my model are presumed to use 'rough inductive reasoning' because they cannot utilize exact information. The information structure in the E-Mail game is generalized and the conditions are characterized under which Rubinstein's results hold. I find that rough inductive reasoning generates a payoff dominant equilibrium where the expected payoffs change continuously (instead of discretely) in the probability of "faulty" communication.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)323-339
Number of pages17
JournalInternational Game Theory Review
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2007
Externally publishedYes


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