The N-Player Trust Game and its Replicator Dynamics

Hussein Aly Abbass, Garrison Greenwood, Eleni PETRAKI

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    11 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Trust is a fundamental concept that underpins the coherence and resilience of social systems and shapes human behavior. Despite the importance of trust as a social and psychological concept, the concept has not gained much attention from evolutionary game theorists. In this letter, an N-player trust-based social dilemma game is introduced. While the theory shows that a society with no untrustworthy individuals would yield maximum wealth to both the society as a whole and the individuals in the long run, evolutionary dynamics show this ideal situation is reached only in a special case when the initial population contains no untrustworthy individuals. When the initial population consists of even the slightest number of untrustworthy individuals, the society converges to zero trusters, with many untrustworthy individuals. The promotion of trust is an uneasy task, despite the fact that a combination of trusters and trustworthy trustees is the most rational and optimal social state. This letter presents the game and results of replicator dynamics in a hope that researchers in evolutionary games see opportunities in filling this critical gap in the literature.
    Original languageEnglish
    Article number7284709
    Pages (from-to)470-474
    Number of pages5
    JournalIEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation
    Volume20
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2016

    Fingerprint

    Replicator Dynamics
    Game
    Evolutionary Game
    Social Dilemma
    Evolutionary Dynamics
    Social Systems
    Human Behavior
    Resilience
    Long-run
    Converge
    Zero
    Concepts

    Cite this

    Abbass, Hussein Aly ; Greenwood, Garrison ; PETRAKI, Eleni. / The N-Player Trust Game and its Replicator Dynamics. In: IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation. 2016 ; Vol. 20, No. 3. pp. 470-474.
    @article{0f93dbf6916246f8b385f164ce6521fe,
    title = "The N-Player Trust Game and its Replicator Dynamics",
    abstract = "Trust is a fundamental concept that underpins the coherence and resilience of social systems and shapes human behavior. Despite the importance of trust as a social and psychological concept, the concept has not gained much attention from evolutionary game theorists. In this letter, an N-player trust-based social dilemma game is introduced. While the theory shows that a society with no untrustworthy individuals would yield maximum wealth to both the society as a whole and the individuals in the long run, evolutionary dynamics show this ideal situation is reached only in a special case when the initial population contains no untrustworthy individuals. When the initial population consists of even the slightest number of untrustworthy individuals, the society converges to zero trusters, with many untrustworthy individuals. The promotion of trust is an uneasy task, despite the fact that a combination of trusters and trustworthy trustees is the most rational and optimal social state. This letter presents the game and results of replicator dynamics in a hope that researchers in evolutionary games see opportunities in filling this critical gap in the literature.",
    keywords = "Evolutionary game theory, N-person trust game, trust, trust game",
    author = "Abbass, {Hussein Aly} and Garrison Greenwood and Eleni PETRAKI",
    year = "2016",
    doi = "10.1109/TEVC.2015.2484840",
    language = "English",
    volume = "20",
    pages = "470--474",
    journal = "IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation",
    issn = "1089-778X",
    publisher = "IEEE, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers",
    number = "3",

    }

    The N-Player Trust Game and its Replicator Dynamics. / Abbass, Hussein Aly; Greenwood, Garrison; PETRAKI, Eleni.

    In: IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, Vol. 20, No. 3, 7284709, 2016, p. 470-474.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - The N-Player Trust Game and its Replicator Dynamics

    AU - Abbass, Hussein Aly

    AU - Greenwood, Garrison

    AU - PETRAKI, Eleni

    PY - 2016

    Y1 - 2016

    N2 - Trust is a fundamental concept that underpins the coherence and resilience of social systems and shapes human behavior. Despite the importance of trust as a social and psychological concept, the concept has not gained much attention from evolutionary game theorists. In this letter, an N-player trust-based social dilemma game is introduced. While the theory shows that a society with no untrustworthy individuals would yield maximum wealth to both the society as a whole and the individuals in the long run, evolutionary dynamics show this ideal situation is reached only in a special case when the initial population contains no untrustworthy individuals. When the initial population consists of even the slightest number of untrustworthy individuals, the society converges to zero trusters, with many untrustworthy individuals. The promotion of trust is an uneasy task, despite the fact that a combination of trusters and trustworthy trustees is the most rational and optimal social state. This letter presents the game and results of replicator dynamics in a hope that researchers in evolutionary games see opportunities in filling this critical gap in the literature.

    AB - Trust is a fundamental concept that underpins the coherence and resilience of social systems and shapes human behavior. Despite the importance of trust as a social and psychological concept, the concept has not gained much attention from evolutionary game theorists. In this letter, an N-player trust-based social dilemma game is introduced. While the theory shows that a society with no untrustworthy individuals would yield maximum wealth to both the society as a whole and the individuals in the long run, evolutionary dynamics show this ideal situation is reached only in a special case when the initial population contains no untrustworthy individuals. When the initial population consists of even the slightest number of untrustworthy individuals, the society converges to zero trusters, with many untrustworthy individuals. The promotion of trust is an uneasy task, despite the fact that a combination of trusters and trustworthy trustees is the most rational and optimal social state. This letter presents the game and results of replicator dynamics in a hope that researchers in evolutionary games see opportunities in filling this critical gap in the literature.

    KW - Evolutionary game theory

    KW - N-person trust game

    KW - trust

    KW - trust game

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84973334701&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.mendeley.com/research/nplayer-trust-game-replicator-dynamics

    U2 - 10.1109/TEVC.2015.2484840

    DO - 10.1109/TEVC.2015.2484840

    M3 - Article

    VL - 20

    SP - 470

    EP - 474

    JO - IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation

    JF - IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation

    SN - 1089-778X

    IS - 3

    M1 - 7284709

    ER -