Tobacco Industry Pseudo-Transformation: The Role of “Vested Interests,” Allies and Third Parties

The tobacco industry seeks to promote its narrative as “responsibly leading the transition” towards a “smokefree future” while continuing its “business-as-usual” model of maximizing profits from the sale of combustible cigarettes with assistance from its allies to influence policy agendas to undermine public health goals.1 Public health advocates and researchers have highlighted the inconsistency between tobacco industry transformation rhetoric and cigarette manufacturers’ ongoing business practices, described by Edwards et al.1 as the “pseudo-transformation” of the tobacco industry. However, the behavior of third-parties, tobacco industry allies and other commercial actors, such as retailers, trade associations, and business groups, who also benefit from continuing a business-as-usual model of tobacco supply has received less attention. This commentary discusses how these actors often act as a proxy for the tobacco industry while also engaging in “pseudo-transformation” via corporate social responsibility (CSR) rhetoric.

The World Health Organization framework convention on tobacco control (FCTC) restricts the direct influence of the tobacco industry via Article 5.3 by requiring parties to protect public health policies from “commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry.” However, this provision is typically interpreted as applying to overt interactions with those entities defined by the FCTC as the tobacco industry (manufacturers, importers, and wholesalers) and not applying to the covert influence they wield through acting in partnership with other commercial actors (eg, retailers, trade associations, and business groups).2 For example, Australia’s obligations under the FCTC have been incorporated into public policy documents such as the Australian Government’s Guidance for public officials on interacting with the tobacco industry, but this guidance only requires reporting of explicit interactions with tobacco companies, not those of the broader commercial actors who act in concert with these companies, such as retailers or trade organizations. Similarly, while some political parties and jurisdictions have sought to ban political donations from tobacco companies to limit their direct influence, this only affects the corporations themselves as ­“tobacco business entities.” It is well understood that tobacco industry “third-party mobilization” has played a significant role in undermining tobacco control actions,3 enabling the tobacco industry to develop reputation management, coalition building and information management strategies to protect their interests by aligning with industry allies to lobby on their behalf or amplify their arguments undermining the FCTC.