This thesis will analyse the Gulf War against three of the four levels of Strategy, with emphasis on the role technology played at each leveL to determine if this conflict has indeed heralded a change in the nature of decision-making in conventional war and the strategy that guides it. The melhodology used to achieve this objective will be firstly, to establish a theoretical and analytical framework upon which the subsequent analysis can be based. This will be accomplished by examining the writings of Clausewitz and modern strategic theorists, particularly those works relating to strategy and its relationship with technology. Secondly, the 'enabling' technologies that were instrumental in the Coalitions overwhelming viclory will be addressed. Thirdly, an analysis will be made of the management of war at the Grand Strategic, Strategic and Operational Levels in relation to the Gulf War. Fourthly. an analysis of selected organisational theorists will be made by developing a model for decision-making that may offer some descriptive and possibly prescriptive linkages of the major Coalition decision pathways. The conclusions that can be drawn from the conflict concerning technology's increased importance to war decision-making and the strategy.
|Date of Award||1993|